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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

BASIC PLAN CABINDA

1. Basic Plan CABINDA is designed to provide our organization with a nucleus of selected American officers who would stay behind to direct the activities of indigenous agents and potential resistance groups in the event that Germany is occupied by the enemy. Selection of personnel would be based on (1) ability to pass as a Central European national; (2) personal qualifications of leadership, adaptability, previous experience, security, health; and (3) willingness to volunteer for such an assignment. A maximum of five senior staff officers presently assigned to DAD, and ten junior officers or field assistants (with preference given to Communications personnel) would be included in the plan.

2. Personnel selected would be provided immediately with false documentation and appropriate personal equipment (clothing, etc.) in line with their individually prepared cover stories. Supplies, including radio sets, ciphers, signal plans, arms, food, drugs and valuables, would be hidden for their eventual use. Crystals and the location of the supplies would be retained by the base chief for issuance to the officers on activation. It is anticipated that immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, personnel would depart from their present area of work and make their way individually to a previously specified area - e.g., southern Bavaria. Each senior officer would be assigned at least one, and possibly two, W/T operators. The junior officers would work under the direction of the senior officer to whom assigned. The senior officers would not be in contact with one another and would operate independently. They would be instructed to make no attempt to contact our forward headquarters for at least two months following the enemy occupation of Germany.

3. Full consideration has been given to the security hazard inherent in the capture of any one of our senior officers. We have accepted the calculated risk that their experience and personal qualities would not enable them to outwit their interrogator. If they break, it is questionable whether the historical information they could provide would be of especial value to the enemy under war-time conditions. They would be unable to compromise one another since no one officer would have knowledge of another's stay behind plans. They could, of course, provide detailed background on our organization per se, and could compromise agents known to them. The advantage of having highly qualified American intelligence specialists on the spot outweigh, in our opinion, the security hazard. Their chances of survival are considered greater if they stay behind than if later attempts are made to infiltrate or drop them.

It is estimated that the cost of equipping personnel with supplies required during the first six months following hostilities would not exceed \$75,000.

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Name _____
Officer U. F. E. G.
Date 27 May 1981 T.S.S.

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REQUEST NO. _____
 NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
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5. This plan has not been discussed with DAD, but we know from personal conversations with officers such as [redacted] and [redacted] that they consider it a practical proposal and expect that certain of our qualified personnel would volunteer. In the event that approval in principle is given to CABINDA, the field will be instructed to submit a detailed survey of the possibilities, with recommendations for its implementation. At that stage, coordination with Commo and OPC would be effected.

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