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Security Information

Chief, EE

ATTN: []

Info: OOM

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operation/ZIPPER

SATURN

1. In the context of the general operational review being undertaken by ZIPPER, M is indulging in some soul-searching of its own. We thought you might be interested in some random thoughts of WOLLMANN prepared by him for the information and guidance of his staff. There is nothing particularly new or revealing in the statement but it does illustrate WOLLMANN's basic concept of the form and substance of staybehind operations.

2. As the New Year approaches M is confronted with some hard facts of life which will require readjustments in SATURN. Most important M's monthly allocation of RM 105,000 has been reduced to RM 90,000 by ZIPPER Headquarters which in turn acted in response to over-all economy pressures exerted by FOE. This initially means abandonment of the plan to establish another STORCH district in Berlin. Quite possibly it may mean that STORCH in general will fall short of anticipated goals.

3. We are not opposed to this reduction in funds providing it does not impair current operations. We have watched SATURN snowballing over the past year. It has recently become apparent that individual case officers have reached or surpassed the limits of efficiency. In an effort to broaden coverage by recruiting new teams something has been sacrificed in the way of quality and security. It is time to place renewed emphasis on overhaul of old teams and rounding out partially completed teams. For example, many STORCH agents have been active for three or more years. Undoubtedly some of these old timers should be dropped on the basis of length of service alone and replacements recruited. Others who have not participated in training exercises for long periods or have had only infrequent contact with their case officers are in danger of going stale. More training exercises must be scheduled. A few agents previously earmarked for dropping because of security considerations are in fact still employed. Other problems which will require increasing attention include revision of activation instructions, preparation of new signal plans, introduction of the resident principle and FOX training.

4. Concurrently other aspects of SATURN particularly the burial program can be expected to taper off during the next year.

5. The foregoing suggests that there is much to be done to improve the quality of SATURN. It is our feeling that it can be done within the limits of the present budget although M might take exception. However, should it prove necessary to expand SATURN substantially beyond its present size, it will be necessary to provide more money.

Approved: []

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ESTABLISHMENT OF 34 NETS

A. The nets to be established by 34 are intended to be activated:

- at an unknown time;
- against an enemy whose tactics and local movements cannot be predetermined;
- through the activities of agents whose personal, professional and local circumstances at the time are unknown.

(In comparison the temporary and local contact of a "working net" i.e. a 50 net with the enemy is already evident. These agents undergo a continual testing. Agents who are unsuitable or endangered can be continually recognized or replaced)

The "unknowns" listed above can be met by the following measures:

I. The "unknown time" should be compensated for by an adequate selection of agents so that they

- (1) according to human judgement are useable for a longer time; people who stick to their decision and who possess a clear-cut attitude;
- (2) will not drop out at a decisive time; people who as a result of their character and constitution, their professional, political and family circumstances will presumably survive the crisis of being overrun.

(Therefore the paid agent and the casual informant cannot be considered).

II. The "unknown place" can be met with a careful directed examination of the military-geographic, economic and political situation of Western Germany on the basis of a close cooperation with 45 and a purposeful spotting and recruiting of agents only in those areas which according to all predictions will remain of interest in wartime.

III. The unknowns which lie with the agent himself (changes in his residence or employment which occur in the interim between recruitment and war) should be compensated for (1) by training which will prepare him to carry out his mission at another location as well as at his normal place of work and employment; (2) by commitment arrangements which offer a certain assurance that the agent upon being moved will again have a channel to the Zentrale.

B. The lack of active contact with the enemy until war and the fact that the 34 nets are prepared over years without being used leads to special dangers in this work. If the enemy succeeds in learning of the establishment of 34 nets this will not be recognized through the elimination of agents or Spielfehler. This will become obvious for the first time in case of war. In order not to endanger the results of many long years of work it is therefore necessary:

(1) to sharply separate the operations of 34 from all other operations in order to prevent or hinder the enemy from gaining knowledge of even the existence of 34;

(2) it is the responsibility of 34 to provide special cover for all the 34 staff and agent personnel and to supervise the operation so that danger -- of penetration by the enemy -- even before war can be prevented in so far as possible.

(3) to thoroughly consider in advance the question of covering 34 operations after legalization of the organization.

C. Besides the operational measures noted above a certain number of organizational measures can be taken. In addition to the normal (34) intelligence collection team it is necessary to establish two other types of cells:

(1) Self-regenerating cells or residents with the mission of recruiting new sources whose value can be determined only after war has started or whose stayability cannot be judged in peacetime. Because these residents will have only radio contact with the Zentrale they differ essentially from those residents currently being established by 50.

(2) Support cells with the mission of maintaining the operational capabilities of the net by furnishing supplies and by providing the channel for the introduction of new agents from the outside. (FOX and WIESEL programs).

D. In general in comparison to the current activities of 50, 34 operations are based on a wartime situation in which all the usual means of combat intelligence collection will be employed: ground reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, PW interrogation and monitoring operations. Therefore 34 operations are directed against broad long-range strategic targets to supplement the intelligence collection efforts mentioned above. It is not to be expected that a few days after the outbreak of war a satisfactory flow of intelligence reports will be established. 34 activities are directed against important transportation, economic and political targets affecting the enemy's war potential. Tactical reports which are of value for only a few hours or at most for a few days can be expected only as a by-product. With the advent of war and the evacuation of case officers the net transforms itself into a system of lines in which only one agent transmits his reports through one radio operator. Herein lies a great strength in that compromise of one line will not lead to the compromise of the whole net (in so far as B above is realized). On the other hand use of radio in transmission of information requires a sharp concentration on the essential elements. With radio it is not possible to supply endless statistical material, "garbage" material, etc. Therefore 34 agents must be trained to recognize essential information and transmit it in concise accurate reports. Training in this work is especially difficult and requires a relatively high standard of performance on the part of both trainers and agents.

E. Such a net which is directed only by radio requires its own special leadership. It is necessary that the same persons who worked with the net in peacetime be assigned to the same work in wartime.

SUMMARY

34 can only achieve success when emphasis is put on quality rather than quantity. This applies to agents as well as staff members. In this connection the necessity for a continual idealistic indoctrination must be stressed. The agent in the Soviet Zone hates the Soviets from his own experience. For the agents being prepared in Western Germany a special psychological guidance is necessary in order to harden them against Soviet propaganda methods prior to commitment.